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RISK DISTRIBUTION AND
THE LAW OF TORTS:
CARRYING CALABRESI FURTHER
MARK A. GEISTFELD*
I
INTRODUCTION
Just over fifty years ago, in a seminal article called Some Thoughts on Risk
Distribution and the Law of Torts, Guido Calabresi addressed the claim made
by leading scholars that the “central policy issue in tort law is whether the
principal criterion of liability is to be based on individual fault or a wide
1
distribution of risk and loss.” As Calabresi pointed out, “to say ‘risk
2
distribution’ is really to say very little.” Risk distribution, he explained, is an
ambiguous concept that can refer to the manner in which tort liability for
accidental harms affects the allocation of scarce resources, the spreading of
losses across society, or the attainment of normatively desirable distributive
outcomes. Calabresi then systematically employed economic analysis to show
how these different conceptions of risk distribution affect the formulation of
tort rules, a novel approach that made the article one of the (two) founding
3
documents of the new economic analysis of law.
The first two conceptions of risk distribution identified by Calabresi—the
allocation of scarce resources and risk spreading—are combined in the (now)
conventional economic analysis of tort law. Under this analysis, tort rules
should minimize the social cost of accidents first by incentivizing risky actors to
exercise cost-effective care, and then by spreading the residual risks to minimize
insurance costs.
Although the conventional economic analysis of minimizing accident costs
can be traced to Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts,
Calabresi has not embraced the approach with the same fervor as others.
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1. 70 YALE L.J. 499, 499 (1961) (quoting CHARLES O. GREGORY & HARRY KALVEN, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 689 (1st ed. 1959)).
2. Id.
3. See Richard Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEX. L. REV. 757, 758–59 (1975)
(characterizing the publication of articles by Calabresi and Ronald Coase in the early 1960s as giving
birth to the “new” economic analysis of law, which differs from prior economic analyses that did not
“apply economic analysis in a systematic way to areas of law that did not purport to regulate economic
relationships”).
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Drawing in part on the scholarship of Ronald Dworkin, Calabresi explained in a
subsequent article that an inquiry exclusively concerned with minimizing
accident costs in order to attain allocative efficiency, “defined narrowly to mean
wealth maximization,” is a “meaningless concept” without a basis in the
4
normatively appropriate “starting points or distributional values.” Calabresi
also made the same type of point in his highly influential book The Costs of
Accidents: “I do not treat [justice or fairness] as a goal of the same type as cost
reduction but as a veto or constraint on what can be done to achieve cost
5
reduction.” As implied by Calabresi’s repeated emphasis on the fundamental
importance of entitlements and their associated distributive values, the only
issue of risk distribution that ultimately matters is whether tort rules distribute
risk in the manner required by the governing distributive norms of fairness or
justice, a matter not adequately addressed by the conventional economic
6
analysis of tort law.
Calabresi’s concern for distributive matters is most fully expressed in a later
7
article, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further. Calabresi first
showed that society must always be at a Pareto-optimal point, or one at which
no change is possible that would gain unanimous consent: “Transaction costs
(including problems of rationality and knowledge), no less than existing
technology, define what is currently achievable in any society—the Pareto
frontier. It follows that any given society is always or will immediately arrive at
8
a Pareto-optimal point given transaction costs.” Calabresi accordingly
9
concluded “that the Pareto criterion is of no general use as a normative guide,”
a limitation that makes it necessary for economists to account for distributive
concerns:
For if where we are is, for the moment, Pareto optimal and, absent innovations, all
improvements must, ex ante, entail some losers, then we can also do away with . . .
“convenient” assumptions designed to negate the existence of losers. Distributional
analysis becomes inevitable and hence essential, and economists must, at a minimum,
become explicit about the distributional judgments (or guesses) that they are making.
Decisionmakers can then accept or reject such judgments and guesses as they choose.

4. Guido Calabresi, First Party, Third Party, and Product Liability Systems: Can Economic
Analysis of Law Tell Us Anything About Them?, 69 IOWA L. REV. 833, 833–34 (1984) [hereinafter
Calabresi, First Party, Third Party, and Product Liability Systems] (citing other scholars who had
reached a similar conclusion, including Ronald Dworkin, Why Efficiency?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563
(1980) [hereinafter Dworkin, Why Efficiency?]). In an earlier exchange with Dworkin, Calabresi stated
that “I found myself substantially in agreement” with Dworkin’s position. Guido Calabresi, An
Exchange: About Law and Economics: A Letter to Ronald Dworkin, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 553, 554
(1980) (discussing Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980)).
5. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 24 n.1
(1970).
6. Although the conventional economic analysis of tort law maintains that the redistribution of
wealth from the rich to the poor can be attained at least cost by tax transfers rather than by tort rules,
these wealth redistributions do not fully exhaust the other forms of redistribution that might be
required as a matter of justice or fairness. See infra Part IV.
7. 100 YALE L.J. 1211 (1991) [hereinafter Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto].
8. Id. at 1212.
9. Id. at 1216.
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But economists need no longer use terms in ways that, however unintentionally, can
easily be misunderstood by decisionmakers as leading 10to conclusions that have
normative validity independent of their distributional effects!

As Calabresi had recognized in an earlier article, the normative validity of a
distributional outcome is determined by initial entitlements: “[A]bsent such a
notion of starting points, we cannot say anything about distribution or equality
either. We cannot meaningfully say that we have treated Marshall and Taney
equally, or justly favored Marshall over Taney, without a concept of what it is to
11
treat them equally.” The just distribution of risk depends on the initial
specification of legal entitlements, which in turn depends on the principle of
equality that guides (and constrains) the legal system.
Having recognized that the principle of equality determines the just
distribution of risk in tort law, Calabresi then maintained that the issue can be
informed by economic analysis:
For it seems to me that economists and lawyer-economists can have a great deal to
say, as scholars, about what is distributionally desirable. We need not simply make our
distributional judgments clear and let political decisionmakers accept them or not. We
can develop scholarly definitions of just distributions, both theoretical definitions, and
definitions based on empirical studies of particular societies. But
a further discussion
12
of such distributional studies . . . must await subsequent articles.

The subsequent articles never appeared for reasons amply explained by the
demands of a law-school deanship followed by those of a federal judicial
appointment. Although Calabresi has underscored the importance of
distributive economic analysis, this methodological approach remains largely
undeveloped.
In this article, I try to carry Calabresi further by more rigorously showing
how distributive economic analysis can be relevant to the normative evaluation
of tort law. In contrast to Calabresi’s conclusion about the “pointlessness of
Pareto,” I argue in part II that the Pareto principle embodies an autonomybased compensatory norm that tort law can rely on to implement corrective
justice under nonideal conditions that foreclose fully compensatory consensual
exchanges. Because the compensatory decision rule governs forced exchanges,
it must be limited to those nonconsensual interactions that adequately respect
the autonomy of the two interacting parties. Within the context of these forced
exchanges, a compensatory payment satisfies a compensatory obligation, which
in turn is defined by the correlative compensatory right. In part III, I identify
the substantive properties of a compensatory tort right and then show how the
right holder’s compensatory demands can be fully satisfied by the duty holder’s
exercise of reasonable care in a wide range of cases. A compensatory norm can
be fully implemented by the distribution of risk without requiring an
10. Id. at 1228.
11. Calabresi, First Party, Third Party, and Product Liability Systems, supra note 4, at 850
(emphasis added).
12. Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto, supra note 7, at 1228; see also Calabresi, First Party,
Third Party, and Product Liability Systems, supra note 4, at 843 (“In choosing among systems of auto
accident avoidance we . . . must take the distributional preferences of our society into account.”).
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entitlement to compensatory damages in the event of injury, a conclusion that
sheds new light on Calabresi’s original insight about the varied meanings of risk
distribution within tort law.
As I have argued at length elsewhere, such a compensatory norm
13
persuasively explains the important tort doctrines governing physical harm,
and so in part IV, I employ distributive economic analysis to show how the tort
system can be conceptualized as a compensatory mechanism. Tort
compensation is not merely a form of accident insurance as assumed by the
conventional economic analysis of tort law; it fits readily into Calabresi’s
taxonomy of desirable legal innovations that shift the Pareto frontier
14
outwards. By expanding the feasible set of fully compensatory outcomes that
can be attained under existing social conditions, the tort system enables
individuals to engage in new risky activities while adequately compensating
those who are disadvantaged by the risky behavior. The tort system has a
normative dimension that is brought into sharp relief by the type of distributive
economic analysis championed by Calabresi but neglected by the conventional
economic analysis of tort law.
II
THE PARETO PRINCIPLE AS A NORMATIVE GUIDE UNDER NONIDEAL
CONDITIONS
Under the Pareto principle, the allocation of resources in state B is (Pareto)
superior to an alternative allocation in state A if and only if the move from A to
B would make at least one person better off and no one worse off. Those who
would benefit from the change would support it, and no one else would disagree
because none of them would be harmed by the change. Consequently, the
15
Pareto test “is a simple unanimity requirement.”
Within welfare economics, the Pareto criterion provides a method for
overcoming the limitations of utilitarianism. In the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, traditional welfare economists compared alternative
situations by assuming that individual utilities can be quantified (as cardinal
measures) and then compared across individuals. This decision rule selects
utility-maximizing outcomes, and so its normative justifiability depends on the
16
validity of utilitarianism. By the late 1930s, the need to make interpersonal
17
utility comparisons troubled welfare economists. To solve this problem,
13. See generally MARK A. GEISTFELD, TORT LAW: THE ESSENTIALS (2008) [hereinafter
GEISTFELD, TORT LAW].
14. Cf. Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto, supra note 7, at 1230 (discussing different types of
innovations, including those that can result in shifts of the Pareto frontier “which create winners and
may or may not create losers as well”).
15. Id. at 1215.
16. See, e.g., Amartya Sen, The Possibility of Social Choice, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 349, 351–52
(1999) (tracing origins of traditional welfare economics to Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism).
17. Id. at 352 (discussing the influence of L. Robbins, Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: A
Comment, 48 ECON. J. 635 (1938)).
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prominent economists rejected the utilitarian decision rule in favor of the new
welfare economics, which posits that interpersonal utility comparisons are
impossible or otherwise outside the scope of economic analysis. The new
welfare economics compares alternative economic situations by relying on the
Pareto principle, which evaluates policies in terms of unanimous choice rather
than interpersonal utility comparisons. “[A]ll the important conclusions of
welfare economics can be made to follow from” an analysis reformulated in
terms of individual choice rather than the cardinal measures of individual utility
18
or welfare required by utilitarianism.
In order for a change to satisfy the Pareto criterion, those who would
otherwise be disadvantaged by the change must be fully compensated by those
who would benefit from it. The compensatory exchange requires the actual
consent (or unanimous approval) of all concerned parties, yielding an outcome
in which no one is made worse off (due to the receipt of full compensation) and
at least one person is made better off (one’s willingness to make a
compensatory payment implies the proposed change must, on balance, make
her better off).
As is widely recognized, however, the requirement of actual consent to fully
compensatory exchanges turns the Pareto principle into a practically
19
unattainable ideal. What, then, should be made of the Pareto principle under
nonideal conditions in which actual consent to fully compensatory exchanges is
not feasible? The answer depends on whether the governing principle of
equality is welfarist or instead accounts for nonwelfarist concerns of individual
autonomy or equal freedom.
A. Welfarism and the Pareto Principle
A welfarist principle of equality, such as utilitarianism, is only concerned
about welfare; it values change only insofar as it would increase individual
welfare, and by extension, social welfare. Within a welfarist system, the Pareto
principle has only instrumental value: Any change that would be Pareto
superior must also increase social welfare. The Pareto principle is merely an
instrument for identifying welfare-enhancing policy changes. Aside from this
role, the Pareto requirement of unanimous approval has no independent
normative value under welfarism.
For example, suppose there are 100 individuals in a community that is
considering two tort rules. “Rule 1” would make each person in the community
better off by one unit of welfare, satisfying the Pareto principle. “Rule 2” would
make ninety-nine people better off by 1.10 units of welfare, while making one
person worse off by eight units of welfare. Suppose the social-welfare function
is utilitarian (a form of welfarism), so that the social planner gives equal weight
to each unit of individual welfare. The planner will choose Rule 2, which has a

18. I.M.D. LITTLE, A CRITIQUE OF WELFARE ECONOMICS 36–37 (2d ed. 1957).
19. E.g., id. at 95–96.
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total welfare gain of 100.9 units, whereas Rule 1 has a total welfare gain of 100
units. The unanimous approval of Rule 1 is irrelevant to the utilitarian planner.
Welfarism in general, like utilitarianism in particular, merely compares total
welfare under the two rules and places no weight on the fact one rule is
20
unanimously approved and the other is not.
Within a welfarist system, individual consent matters only because without
the ability to “measur[e] utility directly, the only way to demonstrate that a
change in the allocation of resources is Pareto superior is to show that everyone
21
affected by the change consented to it.” When governed by a welfarist
principle of equality, the Pareto criterion merely provides a reliable way to
determine whether a change would increase social welfare. The criterion has no
other value.
For this reason, the welfarist rationale for the Pareto principle extends to
nonideal conditions in which transaction costs prevent fully compensatory
consensual exchanges. For any proposed change that would benefit some
individuals and harm others, if the winners would be willing to fully compensate
the losers, the change must be welfare-enhancing per the logic of the Pareto
principle, regardless of whether the exchange actually occurs. The welfare
properties of the Pareto principle are not altered by the absence of fully
compensatory exchanges.
But in contrast to the ideal formulation of the Pareto principle, the nonideal
formulation relies on hypothetical compensation and hypothetical consent. A
hypothetical compensatory exchange poses no problem for welfarism, however,
as long as there is a reliable method for monetizing the costs and benefits of the
22
proposed change.
Known as the Kaldor–Hicks criterion, this decision rule forms the basis of
cost-benefit analysis. It tries to replicate the welfare-enhancing properties of the
Pareto principle under nonideal conditions in which policy changes cannot be
implemented by fully compensatory consensual exchanges. Social conditions
that block consensual agreements pose no intractable problem for a welfarist
conception of the Pareto principle.
This version of the Pareto principle is embodied in the conventional
economic analysis of tort law, which employs cost-benefit analysis (the Kaldor–
Hicks criterion) to formulate liability rules that minimize the social cost of

20. To be sure, the utilitarian planner could select the welfare-maximizing outcome and then
obtain unanimous approval by redistributing the welfare gain to ensure that everyone is made better
off. Doing so could only be justified, however, if the redistribution would increase social welfare. Once
again, the utilitarian decision is governed by the increase in social welfare and not unanimous approval.
21. Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law
Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 488–89 (1980) [hereinafter Posner, The Ethical and Political
Basis of the Efficiency Norm].
22. Cf. id. at 490 (“[I]f the utilitarian could devise a practical utility-metric he could dispense with
the consensual or transactional method of determining whether an allocation of resources was Pareto
superior; indeed, he could dispense with the concept of Pareto superiority itself.”).
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23

accidents. The welfarist version of the Pareto principle accordingly supplies a
normative rationale for cost-minimizing tort rules.
B. Individual Autonomy and the Pareto Principle
Welfarism is not the only plausible method for specifying the requirements
of equality. If the principle of equality instead requires the government to give
each citizen an equal opportunity to lead a life of his or her own choosing, then
the Pareto principle is normatively valuable for nonwelfarist reasons of
individual autonomy and equal freedom.
The relation between the Pareto principle and individual autonomy has
been famously discussed by Richard Posner:
[I]t is also possible to locate Pareto ethics in a different philosophical tradition from
the utilitarian, in the tradition, broadly Kantian, which attaches a value over and
above the utilitarian to individual autonomy. One ethical criterion of change that is
highly congenial to the Kantian emphasis on autonomy is consent. And consent is the
24
operational basis of the concept of Pareto superiority.

Having recognized that the normative appeal of the Pareto criterion can be
defined by the promotion of individual autonomy through consensual exchange,
Posner then made the more provocative claim that a potential Pareto
improvement—one that satisfies the Kaldor–Hicks criterion of hypothetical
compensation—also furthers the normative value of autonomy because
25
individuals would hypothetically consent to such changes. On Posner’s view,
both the Pareto principle and the Kaldor–Hicks criterion can be justified in the
nonwelfarist terms of individual autonomy, eliminating any normative
difference between the two and the concomitant need to define one as the
normatively ideal decision rule (the Pareto principle) and the other as its
nonideal counterpart (the Kaldor–Hicks criterion).
Numerous scholars have forcefully rejected this claim, including both
Calabresi and Dworkin. Both rejected the claim for similar reasons pertaining
26
to ambiguities in the hypothetical construct assumed by Posner’s analysis.
Dworkin also pointed out that without the requirement of actual consent, “the
27
Pareto criterion . . . simply collapses into the utilitarian criterion.” The
relevant decision rule is reduced to the form of cost-benefit analysis entailed by
the Kaldor–Hicks test, which is comparable to the Pareto criterion only insofar
as each identifies policy proposals that promote social welfare. Only the
requirement of actual consent differentiates the two tests, leading Dworkin to
23. See sources cited supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text.
24. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm, supra note 21, at 489–90.
25. Id. at 491–94.
26. Compare Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto, supra note 7, at 1223 (“The moment we deal
with a real situation, we know something more about who wins and who loses. Once we are no longer
ignorant, any number of differences may cause us to believe that losses or gains to some matter more
than losses or gains to others.”), with Dworkin, Why Efficiency?, supra note 4, at 579 (“But since Posner
has in mind a counterfactual rather than an actual choice, any selection of a degree or date of ignorance
must be wholly arbitrary, and different selections would dictate very different rules as fair.”).
27. Dworkin, Why Efficiency?, supra note 4, at 582.
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conclude that without such a requirement, “the Pareto justification is not simply
28
weakened; it is destroyed.”
If the governing principle of equality is not welfarist but instead centers on
individual autonomy or equal freedom, the Pareto criterion would seem to have
value only insofar as actual consent enables individuals to exercise their
autonomy. But actual consent is not feasible under nonideal conditions, and so
29
the Pareto criterion would seem to be “pointless,” as Calabresi concluded.
Although one could understandably dismiss the Pareto principle for these
reasons, doing so would be a mistake. In the same manner that welfarism has
extracted the relevant welfare properties of the Pareto principle in order to
guide decision making under nonideal conditions (the Kaldor–Hicks criterion),
a nonwelfarist principle of equality can extract the relevant normative
properties of the Pareto principle to formulate a decision rule governing cases
in which transaction costs block fully compensatory consensual exchanges.
Within a nonwelfarist system, the Pareto principle is appealing due to the
way in which it equates socially cohesive outcomes with the individual
autonomy furthered by fully compensatory consensual exchanges. The linkage
of social cohesion, individual autonomy, and full compensation is still desirable
under nonideal conditions lacking actual consent. The problem accordingly
reduces to whether it is possible to construct a decision rule that furthers these
values for cases in which the affected parties cannot enter into fully
compensatory consensual exchanges.
When actual consent is not feasible, the autonomy rationale for the Pareto
principle can be retained by a decision rule that limits (nonconsensual)
compensatory exchanges to forms of risky behavior that do not disvalue the
autonomy of those threatened by the behavior. The normative linkage between
autonomy and compensation would be lost if the decision rule relied on
compensation as the sole means to regulate forms of behavior (like rape) that
do not adequately respect the victim’s autonomy. The nonideal decision rule,
therefore, must be limited to those highly common forms of social interaction
that further the autonomy of risky actors without disvaluing or inherently
disrespecting the autonomy of those threatened by the risk. As a matter of
autonomy, the decision rule can permit these risky activities (like automobile
driving) despite the absence of actual consent. When limited to social
interactions of this type, a nonideal decision rule derived from the Pareto
principle would then require risky actors to compensate those who are
disadvantaged by the behavior.
This compensatory decision rule requires further limitation. As Lawrence
Sager has persuasively argued, the Pareto principle does not reliably identify all
potentially justice-enhancing improvements because it does not account for

28. Id.
29. See Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto, supra notes 7, at 1212, 1216; supra text
accompanying notes 7–9.
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30

issues of distributive justice. “[J]ustice is a multi-attributed quality” and
31
“Pareto optimality is a relatively minor attribute of that quality.” As Sager
further explained, the Pareto principle cannot reliably track the requirements of
justice because it focuses on pair-wise comparisons: How does the status quo
compare to a proposed alternative state of affairs? Such a decision rule is path
dependent—it depends on the order in which the pair-wise comparisons are
made—and can therefore lead to results that depart from the “true path”
32
required by justice. Because “there is no readily apparent correlation between
Pareto optimality and more central attributes of justice, like distributional
equality,” Sager concluded that reliance on the Pareto principle for resolving all
33
issues of justice is deeply problematic. To avoid the problems identified by
Sager, a compensatory decision rule derived from the Pareto principle should
not be applied to cases in which issues of distributive justice are presented or in
which pair-wise comparisons otherwise create a long-term problem of path
dependence.
A decision rule satisfies these requirements when limited to the
implementation of corrective justice, a form of justice that is exclusively
concerned with the attainment of justice or equality between two interacting
parties. In addition to addressing concerns distinct from those of distributive
justice or equality across society, corrective justice is case specific and not
subject to the longer-term problem of path dependence. Because it corrects an
injustice or rights violation caused by a specific interaction between a right
holder and duty holder, corrective justice can also be called “compensatory
34
justice.” Consequently, issues of corrective justice can be defensibly addressed
by a rights-based compensatory decision rule that seeks to implement the
normatively appealing attributes of the Pareto principle under nonideal
conditions.
When guided by this decision rule, the welfare economist analyzes the
distributive outcomes that would be produced by two alternative states of
affairs and then identifies how a change from one state to the other can be
corrected to ensure that those who would otherwise be disadvantaged by the
change are adequately compensated. This form of distributive economic
analysis is relevant only for those cases in which the underlying principle of
equality justifies the corrective compensatory measure as being appropriate for
30. Lawrence G. Sager, Pareto Superiority, Consent, and Justice, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 916
(1980).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 927.
33. Id. at 916. A Paretian decision rule is also limited even within a welfarist system. See Giuseppe
Dari-Mattacci & Nuno Garoupa, The Unsolvable Dilemma of a Paretian Policymaker, 16 SUP. CT.
ECON. REV. 117 (2008) (providing a formal analysis showing “that a consistent welfarist method of
policy assessment, that is, one that never violates the Pareto principle, may be incomplete in the sense
that it is incapable of providing a solution to important social welfare problems”).
34. See generally Loren E. Lomasky, Compensation and the Bounds of Rights, in NOMOS XXXIII:
COMPENSATORY JUSTICE 13, 34 (John W. Chapman ed., 1991) (discussing case where requiring an
actor to compensate an unwilling victim restores the victim’s losses).
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protecting those who are disadvantaged by the change (recall the problem of
rape). So conceptualized, distributive economic analysis is constrained by the
normative requirements of equality while being integral to the implementation
of (corrective) justice in concrete cases, the type of economic analysis advocated
35
by Calabresi.
Such a decision rule can justifiably govern tort cases for reasons identified
by liberal egalitarians: “Treating people with equal concern requires that people
36
pay for the costs of their own choices.” As a matter of equality, tort law can
require risky actors to pay for the cost of their autonomous choices by
obligating them to compensate those who are disadvantaged by the interaction.
This type of compensatory norm, embodied in the autonomy-based Pareto
principle, can be implemented by a compensatory tort right and its correlative
compensatory duty, making tort liability a form of corrective justice based on a
first-order duty of compensation. A compensatory tort norm can also be limited
to cases in which the nonconsensual interaction adequately respects the
autonomy of the two parties, thereby satisfying the constraints of equality and
extending the normative appeal of the Pareto principle to nonideal conditions.
So formulated, the compensatory norm embodied in the Pareto principle can
help to resolve tort disputes in cases lacking fully compensatory consensual
exchanges.
Conceptualizing tort liability in terms of a compensatory norm, however,
would seem to create an insurmountable problem: Tort law does not ordinarily
entitle accident victims to compensatory damages. The problem, though, may
be more apparent than real; it rests on the unexamined premise that
compensation is limited to the damages remedy. Any evaluation of a
compensatory tort norm must begin with a more complete statement of a
compensatory tort right and its implications for tort liability.
III
TORT COMPENSATION AS RISK DISTRIBUTION
Within the context of a nonconsensual interaction or forced exchange, a
compensatory payment is comprised of the resources required to satisfy a
compensatory obligation. One’s compensatory obligation, in turn, is defined by
the correlative compensatory entitlement held by the other party.
Consequently, the attributes of a compensatory entitlement or tort right (and its
correlative compensatory obligation or tort duty) determine the compensatory
properties of tort law.

35. See sources cited supra notes 4–12 and accompanying text. It is a separate question whether
this particular form of distributive economic analysis would be embraced by Calabresi. His emphasis on
the need for economic analysis to consider norms of justice or fairness would be satisfied by a welfarist
conception of justice, which yields a different formulation of the Pareto principle under nonideal
conditions for reasons previously discussed in part II.A.
36. WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION 75 (1990).
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Under at least one formulation, a compensatory tort right can explain why
tort law has adopted a default rule of negligence liability that does not entitle
accident victims to compensatory damages unless the defendant breached the
duty to exercise reasonable care. In a wide range of cases, the default rule of
negligence liability can distribute risk in a manner that fully satisfies the
demands of a compensatory right holder, yielding outcomes in which the duty
holder makes the full compensatory payment through the exercise of
reasonable care, thereby eliminating any further compensatory obligation to
pay damages in the event of accidental harm. In the remaining cases, the
compensatory norm justifies a rule of strict liability that must be supplemented
by the default rule of negligence to ensure that risk is distributed in the manner
required by the compensatory tort right. The compensatory properties of risk
distribution can justify the default rule of negligence liability.
A. A Compensatory Tort Right
According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, an individual interest that
“is protected against any form of invasion . . . becomes the subject matter of a
37
‘right.’” The specification of such a right necessarily prioritizes the protected
interest of the right holder over the conflicting interest of the duty holder,
making it possible for the tort rule to burden the subordinate interest of the
duty holder in order to protect the prioritized interest of the right holder. For
example, a rule that protects the individual interest in physical security gives the
security interest of the right holder some sort of legal priority over the
conflicting or invading liberty interest of the duty holder. To do so, the tort rule
must first distinguish these interests in a manner that justifies a priority for the
security interest. The nature of the priority then defines the substantive content
of the tort right and correlative duty. Rights-based tort rules, therefore, can be
characterized by the manner in which they prioritize the legally protected
interests of the right holder over the conflicting or invading interests of the duty
holder.
Leading justice theorists have argued that tort law can prioritize one’s
interest in physical security over another’s conflicting liberty interest for the
basic reason that an individual must be adequately secure in order to live a
38
meaningful life. The exercise of liberty is also essential for living a meaningful
life, and so a priority of a right holder’s security interest cannot defensibly
ignore or negate the duty holder’s conflicting liberty interest. The priority is
justified by a principle of equality that values individual autonomy or selfdetermination. This general principle holds that each person has an equal right

37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. b (1979).
38. See Richard Wright, Justice and Reasonable Care in Negligence Law, 47 AM. J.
JURISPRUDENCE 143, 170–94 (2002) (explaining why leading justice theorists reject the utilitarian
approach of weighing all interests equally and instead maintain that rights-based tort rules can
prioritize the individual interest in physical security over the conflicting liberty and economic interests
of others).
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to autonomy (or freedom or self-determination) and then gives different values
to the individual interests in physical security and liberty, depending on their
39
relative importance for the exercise of the general right. In this respect, a tort
right of security is relative to the right of liberty, a property that explains why
courts have long recognized that “[m]ost of the rights of property, as well as of
40
person . . . are not absolute but relative.” A relative right to physical security is
based on a relative priority of the right holder’s security interest over the
conflicting liberty interest of the duty holder, with the nature of that priority or
relation being determined by the more general right to autonomy (or equal
41
freedom or self-determination).
Based on a relative priority of the security interest, tort rules can be
formulated “to give compensation, indemnity or restitution for harms”—the
42
first purpose of liability according to the Restatement (Second) of Torts. If a
duty holder’s exercise of liberty foreseeably causes physical harm to a right
holder, a compensatory obligation burdens the duty holder’s subordinate liberty
interest to compensate harms it caused to the prioritized security interest of the
right holder; legal fault or an unreasonable liberty interest is not required to
justify liability. The compensatory duty permits individuals to engage in risky
behavior by relying on compensation to protect the right holder’s security
interest, the type of outcome required by a right to security that is relative to a
right to liberty.
A compensatory duty does not limit liability to blameworthy behavior and is
abstract in that sense. For cases in which both the duty holder and right holder
are blameless, “it is a fait accompli that some innocent party will be
burdened. . . . Therefore, it cannot be a moral requirement that no innocent
party lose out as a consequence of his own blameless conduct. All that remains
43
open for decision is how the loss is to be apportioned.” An abstract
compensatory norm allocates that burden to the duty holder as risky actor
based on the relative priority of the right holder’s legally protected interest in
physical security.

39. See, e.g., Jules Coleman & Arthur Ripstein, Mischief and Misfortune, 41 MCGILL L.J. 91, 97
(1995) (arguing that tort law mediates and protects interests in liberty and security depending on the
extent to which they are “necessary or important to living life in a liberal political culture”); Gregory C.
Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 311, 354 (1996) (“For
social contract theory, the interests at stake in accidental risk impositions are not mere preferences
properly measured in dollars, but interests in liberty. These interests represent the background
conditions necessary for the pursuit of conceptions of the good over the course of complete lives.
Accordingly, proper evaluation of risks and precautions requires the qualitative assessment of the way
particular risks and precautions burden the liberties necessary for persons to pursue the aims and
aspirations that give meaning to their lives.”).
40. Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476, 485 (1873).
41. Cf. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 104 (2001) (“No basic liberty is
absolute, since these liberties may conflict in particular cases and their claims must be adjusted to fit
into one coherent scheme of liberties.”).
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901(a) (1979).
43. Lomasky, supra note 34, at 34 (discussing cases of necessity).
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To be justifiable, a compensatory norm must account for any normative
problems created by the right holder’s lack of consent and the poor manner in
which compensatory damages might otherwise protect the right holder’s
autonomy. Most obviously, a tort duty limited to the payment of monetary
compensation for a nonconsensual physical harm can be deeply corrosive of the
right holder’s autonomy (as in a case of rape). To ensure that a duty holder
avoids behavior that disvalues the right holder’s autonomy, a compensatory tort
norm can prohibit behavior of this type, justifying extracompensatory damages
44
that punish the duty holder for having engaged in such reprehensible behavior.
A compensatory tort norm can determine the types of behavior for which a
compensatory obligation adequately respects the right holder’s autonomy.
In most cases, however, risky behavior entails no disrespect for the
autonomy of others; the risk is an unwanted byproduct of the activity. To
establish liability in these cases, a compensatory norm does not require
culpability or personal fault. Instead, the duty holder’s exercise of liberty
establishes the requisite form of responsibility for the foreseeable outcomes of
45
the autonomous choice. The occurrence of foreseeable injury, not any moral
shortcoming in the behavior itself, can then trigger the obligation to pay
compensatory damages.
This form of outcome responsibility is clearly reflected in the common law
maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non lædas, which for present purposes loosely
46
translates into the principle “[u]se your own so as not to injure another.” The
maxim locates the compensatory duty in the injury-causing conduct rather than
the unreasonableness of the injurer’s behavior, and so it has frequently been
47
invoked by courts and commentators to justify rules of strict liability.
Such a compensatory norm can be used not only to justify rules of strict
liability, but also to explain why the tort system relies on a default rule of
negligence liability to govern cases of accidental physical harm. The reason
involves the manner in which the distribution of risk affects the compensatory
properties of a tort rule.
44. See generally Mark A. Geistfeld, Punitive Damages, Retribution, and Due Process, 81 S. CAL.
L. REV. 263 (2008) (discussing the role of punitive damages within a compensatory tort system and
showing that this role persuasively explains the relevant tort rules).
45. For a more extended discussion of this conception of individual responsibility, see TONY
HONORÉ, RESPONSIBILITY AND FAULT 14–40 (1999) and Stephen R. Perry, Responsibility for
Outcomes, Risk, and the Law of Torts, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 72, 92–93 (Gerald
Postema ed., 2001).
46. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1238 (5th ed. 1979). As applied to risky behavior not involving
the use of property, the maxim yields a common law principle that “under the common law a man acts
at his peril.” OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 82 (1881) (stating that “some of the
greatest common law authorities” held this view); see also Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney Gen. v.
Russell, 33 A. 709, 711 (Pa. 1896) (“‘Sic utere tuo non alienum lædas’ expresses a moral obligation that
grows out of the mere fact of membership of civil society. In many instances it has been applied as a
measure of civil obligation, enforceable at law among those whose interests are conflicting.”).
47. See, e.g., Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1254–56 (5th Cir. 1985) (noting that the sic
utere maxim is the basis for the rule of strict liability governing ultrahazardous activities under
Louisiana law).
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B. Compensation and Cost-Minimizing Tort Rules
In a compensatory tort system, the appropriate formulation of liability rules
critically depends on context. Different types of risky interactions create
different types of compensatory problems. The different compensatory
problems have different solutions, most of which do not include an entitlement
to compensatory damages in all cases. Tort rules can instead distribute risk in a
manner that fully satisfies the demands of a compensatory right holder.
A compensatory tort right entitles the right holder to prioritize her interest
in physical security over conflicting liberty interests of the duty holder. If that
priority applies to an interaction between the two parties, it justifies the right
holder’s entitlement to compensatory damages in the event of injury. Such an
interpersonal conflict of security and liberty interests, however, does not exist in
all cases. The structure of the social interaction can result in the right holder
internalizing both the benefits and burdens of the tort duty, creating an
intrapersonal conflict of the right holder’s security and liberty interests. The
right holder does not prioritize the security interest in these cases, and so the
compensatory right no longer entails an entitlement to compensatory damages
in the event of accidental harm.
This outcome occurs when the right holder and duty holder (1) are engaged
in reciprocally risky interactions or (2) are otherwise in a direct or indirect
contractual relationship. In these cases, the right holder expects to derive a net
benefit from the risky interaction, and that form of compensation is maximized
by a negligence rule requiring the duty holder to exercise the cost-minimizing
amount of reasonable care. Satisfaction of this duty distributes risk in a manner
that satisfies fully the right holder’s compensatory demands. No entitlement to
compensatory damages is necessary.
First, consider tort rules governing reciprocal risks. For example, as two
automobiles go past one another on the road, each driver simultaneously
imposes a risk of physical harm on the other. For perfectly reciprocal risks, the
interacting individuals are identical in all relevant respects, including the degree
of risk each imposes on the other, the severity of injury threatened by the risk,
and the liberty interests advanced by the risky behavior. Very few risky
interactions will actually satisfy these conditions. However, due to the
requirement of equal treatment, tort law evaluates risky behavior under an
objective standard that in this instance asks whether the activity is common in
48
the community. Automobile driving is such an activity, so, as an objective
matter, tort rules governing automobile accidents apply to reciprocally situated
48. Compare GEISTFELD, TORT LAW, supra note 13, at 93–95 (explaining why the autonomous
choices made by a right holder—such as the decision not to drive automobiles—would violate the
principle of equal treatment if these choices were to determine unilaterally whether the duty holder
would be subject to negligence or strict liability, and further explaining that this result necessitates a
rule that evaluates reciprocity in the objective terms of whether the activity is common in the
community), with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARMS § 20 cmt. j (2010) (“Whenever an activity is engaged in by a large fraction of the community,
the absence of strict liability can be explained by considerations of reciprocity.”).
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parties, even for cases in which the victim was walking or riding a bicycle.
Reciprocity eliminates any relevant differences between the interacting
parties. For example, each automobile driver has the identical right against the
other, each owes an identical duty to the other, and each expects to derive a net
benefit from the risky activity (the automobile trip in question). In these
circumstances, neither party prioritizes the security interest over the liberty
interest. Instead, each interacting individual reasonably prefers to formulate the
tort rule so its benefits (fully accruing to the individual as reciprocal right
holder) exceed its burdens or cost (also fully borne by the individual as
49
reciprocal duty holder). By minimizing accident costs, the tort rule maximizes
the net benefit that each expects to gain by participating in the activity.
Reciprocity transforms the compensatory problem into one of cost
minimization.
For this reason, neither of the reciprocally situated parties prefers to use tort
liability as a form of insurance. The associated costs of liability or third-party
insurance (equally borne by each party as reciprocal duty holder) significantly
exceed the total cost of first-party insurance and self-insurance (equally borne
50
by each party as reciprocal right holder). To minimize costs, each reciprocally
situated party prefers a tort rule formulated for deterrence purposes only,
justifying a default rule of negligence liability that requires a safety precaution
only if the benefit of risk reduction (fully accruing to each individual as
reciprocal right holder) exceeds the burden or cost of the precaution (also fully
borne by each individual as reciprocal duty holder).
Presumably, the interacting parties would consent to such a rule prior to
their risky interaction if they had the opportunity to do so. However, the rule’s
normative rationale is based on individual autonomy and not hypothetical
consent. A tort rule that rejected each individual’s preference for a costminimizing negligence rule by instead prioritizing the security interest would be
unreasonable or contrary to the autonomy of both parties to the risky
interaction. For this class of cases, a negligence rule requiring the duty holder to
exercise the cost-minimizing amount of care fully satisfies the reasonable
demands of the compensatory right holder—those conforming to the underlying
value of equal autonomy that justifies the compensatory right in the first
instance.
Despite exercising the amount of reasonable care required by the
compensatory tort right, the duty holder does not necessarily eliminate risk,
creating the possibility the interaction might accidentally injure the right holder.
49. For more rigorous demonstration, see Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering:
A Method for Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CALIF. L. REV.
773, 851–52 (1995).
50. See Mark Geistfeld, Should Enterprise Liability Replace the Rule of Strict Liability for
Abnormally Dangerous Activities?, 45 UCLA L. REV. 611, 625–33, 639–46 (1998) (relying on empirical
data and a heuristic assessment to conclude that for each dollar of injury compensation, the individual
would have to pay roughly forty percent more for third-party insurance than for the optimal mix of
first-party insurance and self-insurance).
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In that event, however, the compensatory tort right does not entitle the victim
to an award of compensatory damages—the duty holder’s exercise of
reasonable care has already distributed risk in a manner that fully satisfies the
right holder’s compensatory demands. A compensatory tort obligation does not
entail the payment of compensatory damages in all cases of accidental harm.
A cost-minimizing negligence rule also fully enforces the compensatory tort
right in a second set of cases: those in which the right holder and duty holder
seller are in a direct or indirect contractual relationship, as in product cases
51
involving consumers and manufacturers. The consumer–right holder purchases
or uses a product on the expectation that doing so will be, on balance,
advantageous. By selling the product, the manufacturer creates a risk of
physical injury to which the consumer is exposed. A tort rule that makes the
manufacturer liable for these injuries will affect product costs, price, aggregate
demand, and net profits. To identify the distributive effects of liability, one must
first specify the appropriate baseline for analysis. This baseline cannot be
derived by economic analysis, because cost-benefit analysis depends on prices,
which in turn depend on the initial allocation of legal entitlements or property
52
rights. The initial allocation requires normative justification, and so the
normatively justified tort rule defines the appropriate baseline for evaluating
the distributive impact of tort liability. At this baseline, the consumer pays for
the full cost of tort liability, as the equilibrium product price must cover all of
the seller’s costs, including its liability costs. Consumer interests are the only
ones that factor into the distributive analysis required by the normatively
justified tort rule, explaining why products-liability law recognizes that “it is not
a factor . . . that the imposition of liability would have a negative effect on
53
corporate earnings or would reduce employment in a given industry.” For risks
not threatening injury to bystanders, product cases only implicate an
intrapersonal conflict of consumer interests, those involving physical security,
liberty (regarding product use), and money (product price and other financial
54
costs of product use).
51. Unlike the consumer–manufacturer relationship discussed in the text, in other types of
contractual relationships, the right holder sells something to the duty holder. The most important
example is the employment relationship (the sale of labor), in which the employee must be
compensated for facing work-related risks either by an increase of wages or receipt of compensation for
work-related injuries. The employer minimizes the total compensatory obligation by minimizing
accident costs and compensating workers for the residual risks. Employees currently receive both forms
of compensation, albeit outside of the tort system. (Workplace injuries are governed by workers’
compensation schemes that provide guaranteed compensation for work-related injuries.) Consequently,
workplace injuries provide further support for the conclusion that the law regulates accidental harms in
a compensatory manner, with the different compensatory legal rule in these cases (one of strict
liability) stemming from the different form of the contractual relationship (the right holder as seller
rather than buyer).
52. See Lewis A. Kornhauser, Wealth Maximization, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 679 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
53. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. f (1998).
54. For risks threatening injury to bystanders, the analysis involves the interpersonal mediation of
security and liberty interests characteristic of more general forms of tort liability. See MARK A.
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In comparing her own security and liberty interests, the consumer gives no
special priority to either one. The consumer prefers to pay for product safety
only if the benefit of risk reduction (fully accruing to the consumer) exceeds the
cost of the safety investment (also fully borne by the consumer via the
associated price increase or product-functionality decrease). Consumers
reasonably expect product-safety decisions to be governed by a cost-benefit
calculus, because that decisional rule maximizes the net benefit that consumers
expect to derive from the product. A product that does not satisfy reasonable
consumer expectations is defective and subjects the seller to liability under the
55
widely adopted rule of strict products liability. This rule does not entitle
consumers to compensatory damages in all cases. Due to the relatively high cost
of tort compensation as compared to other forms of insurance, consumers do
not reasonably expect to receive tort compensation for injuries caused by
56
nondefective products. Cost-minimizing tort rules that limit liability to the
physical harms caused by defective products fully satisfy the reasonable
57
compensatory demands of consumer–right holder.
As in cases of objective reciprocity, the duty holder in product cases fully
satisfies the compensatory obligation by making the cost-minimizing
investments in product safety required by the compensatory tort right. Doing so
does not necessarily eliminate risk, but the duty holder (having fully satisfied
the compensatory tort right) is not obligated to pay compensatory damages for
injuries caused by the residual (or reasonable) risks inherent in most
nondefective products. Thus, in the contractual context, just as in the
reciprocal-risk context, the demands of the compensatory right holder are fully
satisfied by the manner in which the tort duty distributes risk. Tort law can fully
enforce the compensatory right without granting an entitlement to
compensatory damages in all cases.
C. Risk Distribution as Nonideal Compensation
In a wide range of cases, the negligence rule can attain the ideal
compensatory outcome by distributing risk to maximize the net benefit that a
right holder expects to derive from the risky interaction, so the right holder is
not made worse off, ex ante, than she would otherwise be in a world without the
risk (and the associated benefit to be gained from participating in the risky
activity). The only remaining cases involve right holders who are not in a direct
or indirect contractual relationship with a duty holder who creates an
GEISTFELD, PRINCIPLES OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 309–20 (2d ed. 2011).
55. See generally id. (using the concept of reasonable consumer expectations to explain the
important substantive tort doctrines involving liability for defective products).
56. See id. at 61–67 (explaining why consumers do not reasonably prefer an entitlement to tort
damages for injuries caused by nondefective products due to the relatively high costs they must incur to
receive tort compensation as compared to the other forms of insurance).
57. See id. at 256–66 (explaining why consumers do not reasonably expect to receive compensatory
damages in most cases of pure economic loss and stand-alone emotional harms, even when caused by
defective products).
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objectively defined nonreciprocal risk of physical harm. In these cases, the
negligence rule can still distribute risk in the manner reasonably required by the
compensatory tort right, but the compensation is not ideal, even when
supplemented by a rule of strict liability.
These cases involve activities that are not common in the community and
create risks above the ordinary level of background risk. A paradigmatic
example involves the use of dynamite for construction purposes, although
objectively defined nonreciprocal risks are also created in myriad other ways,
including instances in which the duty holder’s lack of intelligence or skill creates
dangers above the background level (defined by ordinary intelligence and skill).
For this class of cases, the tort rule must mediate an interpersonal conflict
between the duty holder’s interest in liberty and the right holder’s interest in
physical security. A compensatory tort rule entitles the right holder to prioritize
the security interest, justifying a right to compensatory damages for these
injuries—the same outcome that is attained by the rule of strict liability for
abnormally dangerous activities and the pockets of strict liability within the
58
objectively defined negligence standard.
The compensation afforded by these forms of strict liability, however, does
not fully satisfy the compensatory obligation. In the event of a fatal accident,
the duty holder is not legally obligated to pay compensatory damages for the
decedent right holder’s loss of life’s pleasures because the monetary award
59
cannot compensate a dead person. This limitation of the damages remedy
substantially reduces and potentially eliminates the award of compensatory
60
damages for wrongful death. The most severe type of physical harm cannot be
adequately redressed by a rule of strict liability, creating a compensatory
shortfall.
To solve the compensatory problem inherent in a rule of strict liability, the
right holder reasonably prefers to supplement this rule with a behavioral
obligation of reasonable care that depends on the harm actually threatened to
the right holder (premature death) as opposed to the amount of compensatory
damages available in such cases (zero for a decedent’s loss of life’s pleasures).
When justified by a compensatory right, such a safety obligation must be
derived from the correlative compensatory duty, which can be defined by
reference to the total burden a duty holder would incur under ideal conditions

58. See GEISTFELD, TORT LAW, supra note 13, at 92–97.
59. See, e.g., Andrew J. McClurg, Dead Sorrow: A Story About Loss and a New Theory of
Wrongful Death Damages, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1, 6–7, 20–22 (2005) (finding that the decedent’s loss of life’s
pleasures is not a compensable harm in the vast majority of states).
60. Cf. Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 793, 811 (Ct. App. 2003) (ruling on a punitive
damages award in a wrongful death case for which the decedent’s estate received no compensatory
damages); Edward A. Adams, Venue Crucial to Tort Awards: Study: City Verdicts Depend on Counties,
N.Y. L.J., Apr. 4, 1994, at 1, 5 (reporting results of empirical study finding, among other things, that the
average tort award in New York City between 1984 and 1993 was three times higher for brain damage
than for wrongful death, which in turn was only twice as much as the average damage award for a
herniated disc).
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in which the right holder is always fully compensated. The duty holder does
not bear this entire compensatory burden under a rule of strict liability, because
the monetary-damages remedy cannot compensate a dead right holder for the
loss of life’s pleasures. To eliminate this shortfall, the tort rule can shift that
component of the compensatory obligation from the damages remedy into the
duty to exercise reasonable care. These safety expenditures, when added to the
cost-minimizing precautions that the duty holder would otherwise take under
ideal compensatory conditions, further reduce risk or the likelihood that the
right holder will suffer injury, a benefit or form of compensation for the right
holder. Such a negligence rule requires the duty holder to satisfy the
compensatory obligation, in part, by incurring these expenses through the
exercise of reasonable care. The supplemental rule of strict liability then fulfills
the compensatory obligation with respect to the remaining or residual risks that
are not eliminated by the exercise of reasonable care and threaten injuries that
are compensable with the damages remedy. These abnormally dangerous,
nonreciprocal risks are subject to strict liability, but the default rule of
negligence liability also continues to distribute risk in the manner reasonably
62
required by the compensatory tort right.
Nonetheless, the risk distribution in these cases is not ideal for the right
holder, unlike the distribution in cases of reciprocal risks and products liability.
As developed above, risk distribution is fully compensatory for right holders
who (1) incur the burdens of the compensatory duty (as reciprocally situated
duty holder or consumer) and (2) participate in the risky activity engaged in by
the duty holder (such as driving or selling a product) on the expectation that
doing so will be advantageous (defined by the net benefit the right holder
expects to derive from her automobile trip or use of the product sold by the
63
duty holder). For nonreciprocal risky interactions that occur outside of
contractual relationships, neither condition applies. In these cases, the right
holder does not bear the full burden of the compensatory duty or otherwise
derive a sufficient benefit from the risky activity engaged in by the duty holder,
so it is not possible for tort law to distribute risk in a manner that would fully
compensate the right holder.
For example, a right holder who faces the risk of injury created by the duty
holder’s blasting at a construction site does not bear the full burden of the duty
or otherwise sufficiently benefit from the abnormally dangerous activity. These
interactions will disadvantage the right holder unless she is fully compensated
for any resultant injuries, an outcome that cannot be attained by the
61. For more rigorous development of this argument, see generally Mark Geistfeld, Reconciling
Cost-Benefit Analysis with the Principle that Safety Matters More than Money, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 114
(2001).
62. This reasoning explains why a strictly liable duty holder who reprehensibly rejects the duty to
exercise reasonable care is subject to punitive damages. Cf. Owens-Ill., Inc. v. Zenobia, 601 A.2d 633,
653 (Md. 1992) (adopting the majority rule requiring proof of “actual malice” to justify an award of
punitive damages in cases of strict products liability).
63. See supra Part III.B.
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compensatory-damages remedy for fatal accidents and other irreparable
injuries. The duty holder’s compensatory shortfall can be eliminated by
redirecting these expenditures from the damages remedy to the exercise of
reasonable care, but the right holder will still ordinarily face some risk of injury
that cannot be fully compensated by the damages remedy. Tort law cannot
structure these risky interactions to ensure that the right holder is not made
worse off, ex ante, than she would otherwise be if the interaction did not occur.
This compensatory problem, however, does not justify a ban of the risky
behavior. The compensatory right is based on a relative priority of the security
interest, not an absolute priority that negates or gives no value to conflicting
64
liberty interests. By exercising reasonable care and paying compensatory
damages for the harms foreseeably caused by the residual nonreciprocal risks,
the duty holder fully satisfies the compensatory obligation. This exercise of
liberty furthers the autonomy of the duty holder and has normative value that is
not negated simply just because social conditions or transaction costs sometimes
make it infeasible to attain the ideal compensatory outcome. The reasonable
compensatory demands of the right holder—those that give equal concern to
the autonomy of the duty holder—do not justify a ban of the duty holder’s
exercise of liberty. These interactions can leave the right holder worse off than
she would otherwise be, but tort law still distributes risk in the manner that fully
satisfies the reasonable demands of the compensatory right holder.
D. Breaches of the Compensatory Duty
Breach of the primary duty to exercise reasonable care creates a secondorder duty to pay compensatory damages for the physical harms proximately
caused by the breach. Though inherently related, these two duties are not
substantively equivalent. Due to the inherent limitations of the compensatorydamages remedy, the second-order duty to pay compensatory damages does not
fully substitute for the first-order duty to exercise reasonable care.
The most severe physical harm governed by tort law is wrongful death, and
yet monetary damages cannot compensate a dead right holder for the
premature loss of life. Compensatory damages also do not make the plaintiff–
right holder “whole” in cases of bodily harm, nor does this remedy strive to do
65
so. Premature death and bodily injury are paradigmatic examples of an
irreparable injury, although this common-law category also encompasses
66
damage to real or tangible property. The entire category of physical harms—
64. See supra Part III.A.
65. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 cmt. a (1979) (stating that a damage award for
the loss of life’s pleasures is not supposed to “restore the injured person to his previous position” but
should instead only “give to the injured person some pecuniary return for what he has suffered or is
likely to suffer”).
66. Mark A. Geistfeld, The Principle of Misalignment: Duty, Damages, and the Nature of Tort
Liability, 121 YALE L.J. 142, 164 (2011) [hereinafter Geistfeld, The Principle of Misalignment]
(discussing the rule of irreparable injury and explaining why it ordinarily encompasses damages to real
or tangible property).
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bodily injury or damage to real or tangible property—is comprised of
irreparable injuries that ordinarily cannot be fully compensated by the damages
remedy.
In a case of irreparable injury, breaches of the primary compensatory
obligation to exercise reasonable care will usually not be remedied in a fully
compensatory manner. The exercise of reasonable care is the only way for a
duty holder to fully satisfy the reasonable compensatory demands of the right
holder. The superior compensatory attributes of risk distribution accordingly
explain why negligence is a “behavioral rule” defined by a first-order behavioral
obligation that is substantively more important than the second-order duty to
67
pay compensatory damages for a breach.
To protect the integrity of the first-order duty, tort law prohibits the duty
holder from consciously rejecting or recklessly ignoring the primary duty to
exercise reasonable care. A defendant who engaged in this prohibited conduct
and breached the primary duty is subject to punitive damages, regardless of
whether the defendant was always willing and able to pay compensatory
68
damages. The extracompensatory award of punitive damages is required to
vindicate the plaintiff’s compensatory tort right due to the inherent inadequacy
of the compensatory-damages remedy.
But even in these cases, a duty holder breaches the primary duty only if the
unreasonable conduct proximately caused the right holder to suffer
compensable harm. The duty holder’s failure to exercise reasonable care, no
matter how reprehensible, creates no compensatory obligation in the absence of
injury. There is simply nothing to compensate. In cases of injury, by contrast,
the duty holder’s breach of the primary compensatory duty to exercise
reasonable care creates a compensatory shortfall that triggers the second-order
duty to pay compensatory damages. Tort liability is based on the occurrence of
injury for obvious compensatory reasons that accord with “ordinary moral
evaluation” that careless behavior causing injury is “deemed worse” than
69
careless behavior that does not ripen into harm.
The the inability to compensate fully an irreparable injury explains why the
primary concern of a compensatory negligence rule is to prevent physical harm
by obligating the compensatory duty holder to exercise reasonable care.
According to a leading nineteenth century treatise, in cases of irreparable
injury, “[J]udges have been brought to see and to acknowledge . . . that a
remedy which prevents a threatened wrong is in its essential nature better than a
67. See Mark A. Geistfeld, Tort Law and the Inherent Limitations of Monetary Exchange: Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and the Negligence Rule, 4 J. TORT L. 1, 15 (2011).
68. Geistfeld, The Principle of Misalignment, supra note 66, at 165–69 (identifying the types of
behavior prohibited by the negligence rule and providing citations to cases holding that a defendant
who engaged in such behavior cannot avoid liability for punitive damages even if fully willing and able
to pay compensatory damages).
69. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 942
(2010) (arguing in favor of interpretations of tort law that can incorporate this “framework of moral
thought that people deploy regularly in their daily lives”).

8_GEISTFELD_EIC (DO NOT DELETE)

7/6/2014 1:35 PM

186

[Vol. 77:165

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

remedy which permits the wrong to be done, and then attempts to pay for
70
it . . . .” In seeking to prevent irreparable injuries, the common law has also
long recognized the principle that the tort obligation cannot impose undue
71
hardship on the duty holder. When derived from a compensatory duty, a
primary obligation to reduce the risk of irreparable harm through the exercise
of reasonable care does not impose undue hardship on the duty holder.
Compliance with this duty distributes risk in the manner reasonably demanded
by the holder of the compensatory tort right, making it possible for tort law to
compensate right holders for physical harms that cannot be fully repaired by the
damages remedy.
IV
THE DISTRIBUTIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TORT LAW
As I have shown, if the Pareto principle is justified by the normative value
of individual autonomy or equal freedom, then its normative properties can be
maintained under nonideal conditions with a compensatory decision rule for
72
regulating nonconsensual risky interactions. I then argued that such a decision
rule is plausibly instantiated in the default tort rule of negligence liability that
distributes risk in the manner required by the reasonable demands of a
73
compensatory right holder. The Pareto principle is not “pointless” as Calabresi
74
concluded, although my analysis confirms his more important conclusion that
the economic analysis of risk distribution can inform our understanding of the
75
distributive concerns of justice—in this instance, of corrective justice.
Notwithstanding Calabresi’s exhortations about the importance of
distributive economic analysis, the conventional economic analysis of tort law
only addresses the efficient allocation of scarce resources. This approach
assumes the government’s only valid distributive concern involves the principle
of distributive justice, which governs how wealth should be distributed across
society (by reallocation from the rich to the poor, for example). Wealth
distributions of this type ordinarily can be attained at the least cost through the
76
tax system. Once this distributive concern is rendered irrelevant for tort
70. 3 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA § 1357 (1883); see also Douglas Laycock, The Death of the
Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687, 689 (1990) (“Judges act on these premises, whether or
not they consciously acknowledge all that Pomeroy imputed to them.”).
71. Cf. Laycock, supra note 70, at 732–39 (discussing the rule that monetary damages provide the
remedy for harms that would otherwise be irreparable when equitable relief would interfere with
countervailing rights or impose undue hardship on the duty holder).
72. See supra Part II.
73. See supra Part III.
74. See supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text.
75. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
76. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 993–94
(2001) (“[W]hen legal rules do have distributive effects, the effects usually should not be counted as
favoring or disfavoring the rules because distributional objectives can often be best accomplished
directly, using the income tax and transfer (welfare) programs. One reason economists have tended to
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purposes, compensation has value only as a form of insurance for accidental
injury (otherwise compensation merely shifts a loss from one party to another
without increasing social wealth). The provision of insurance, in turn, is also
more effectively accomplished outside of the tort system, in this instance
77
through systems of private or government insurance. Because other
institutions are more efficient both at redistributing wealth and supplying
insurance, the conventional economic analysis of tort law is limited to a search
for the allocatively efficient rules that would minimize the social cost of
accidents. Compensatory questions are irrelevant.
However, the conventional economic analysis of tort law departs from
78
modern welfare economics by disregarding the Pareto principle. The
conventional analysis only recognizes distributive justice, which governs the
appropriate redistribution of resources across society (from the rich to poor, for
example), whereas the Pareto principle is concerned about compensation within
a group of interacting individuals (those affected by the change in question).
How someone is disadvantaged by an interaction defines the need for
compensation, not the individual’s relative wealth. A primary compensatory
obligation owed to another is a matter of corrective or interactive justice, not
distributive justice. The compensation required by the Pareto principle
fundamentally differs from the redistribution of wealth required by a principle
of distributive justice, and yet that distinctive distributive concern is ignored by
the conventional economic analysis of tort law.
By introducing a new distributive concern, the Pareto principle alters the
economic analysis of tort law for reasons highlighted by Calabresi’s discussion
of the principle:
[E]conomists using the Pareto criterion distinguish between moves to the Pareto
frontier and moves that shift that frontier outward. The first describes the kind of
Pareto superior moves that I have argued do not exist ex ante. The second refers to
technological or other innovations that make possible improvements in well-being
which previously were not feasible: a better wheat, cheap solar energy,
superconductors, manna. What I have been saying is that all changes that we are
concerned with are of one of two sorts. First, there are moves in which there are
winners and losers, i.e., moves along the frontier. In such moves, winners may win
more than losers lose, but compensation is not achievable. These moves can be
justified only if one considers who the winners and losers are and what they have won
or lost. This, of course, is the implicit basis of much of actual law and economic
analysis. Second, and at least as important, are shifts of the frontier which create winners
and may or may not create
losers as well. These have been emphasized much less by
79
economic analysis of law.

Once distributive concerns about “winners” and “losers” have been
expressly incorporated into economic analysis via the Pareto principle, a
favor these direct means of redistribution is that they reach all individuals and are based explicitly on
income.”).
77. See source cited supra note 50 and accompanying text.
78. See sources cited supra notes 16–19 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the Pareto
principle within modern welfare economics).
79. Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto, supra note 7, at 1229–30 (emphasis added).
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compensatory tort system can readily be conceptualized as an innovation that
shifts the Pareto frontier outwards by permitting “changes that do not
80
immediately create new winners and uncompensated losers.” Undoubtedly,
the tort system made everyone better off as compared to the prior social
practices it replaced—blood feuds and so on—but a compensatory tort system
can continue to shift the Pareto frontier outwards as society evolves. Given
what we now know or reasonably could know about risk and safety precautions
as applied to the particular circumstances of a nonconsensual risky interaction,
a compensatory tort rule structures the interaction so that this changed social
relation does not “immediately create new winners and uncompensated losers.”
A compensatory tort system can continually shift the Pareto frontier outwards
from the existing state of affairs by distributing risk to ensure that those who
benefit from new instances of risky behavior satisfy the reasonable
compensatory demands of those who would otherwise be disadvantaged.
For these reasons, a compensatory tort rule illustrates how the Pareto
principle can be implemented by a rights-based legal rule that is not exclusively
concerned about the promotion of social welfare. The existence of such a rule
has been called into question by Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, who have
constructed a proof showing that any “fair” legal rule—defined as one giving
evaluative weight to some factor that does not exclusively depend on welfare—
81
necessarily violates the Pareto principle. This definition of fairness
encompasses the rights-based compensatory tort rules described above, which
entitle the right holder to prioritize the security interest for reasons of
individual autonomy and not social welfare. The proof, however, relies on other
assumptions about a “fair” tort rule that are not applicable to these
compensatory tort rules, and so the conclusion of this proof—that “fair” legal
82
rules necessarily violate the Pareto principle—does not apply. A compensatory
tort right can implement the Pareto principle within a nonwelfarist tort system,
providing an important counterexample to the Kaplow and Shavell proof while
confirming Calabresi’s claims about the importance of distributive economic
analysis.
The reasons behind this conclusion are worth detailing; they illustrate more
fully why Calabresi was correct to conclude that economic analysis can inform
83
important questions of justice. The Kaplow and Shavell proof assumes that in
the evaluation of legal rules, the principle of fairness has a constant, significant
84
weight that is independent of welfare. The proof also assumes that the
80. Id. at 1231.
81. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Any Non-welfarist Method of Policy Assessment Violates
the Pareto Principle, 109 J. POL. ECON. 281, 284 (2001); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, The Conflict
Between Notions of Fairness and the Pareto Principle, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 63, 68–70 (1999).
82. See Mark A. Geistfeld, Efficiency, Fairness, and the Economic Analysis of Tort Law, in
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 234 (Mark D. White ed., 2009).
83. For more extensive discussion, see generally id.
84. The following description of the proof relies on Richard A. Craswell, Kaplow and Shavell on
the Substance of Fairness, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 245, 249–57 (2003).
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(constantly weighted) principle of fairness can be continuously traded off
against some component of welfare. Due to the tradeoff between fairness and
welfare, there will be situations in which the choice of a “fair” legal rule comes
at the expense of some positive welfare gain that would be created by an
“unfair” welfare-maximizing rule. If the savings produced by the welfaremaximizing rule could be costlessly redistributed to all members of society, each
person would benefit from the adoption of that “unfair” rule. But this Pareto
improvement is barred by the nonwelfarist principle of fairness, creating the
conflict between the Pareto principle and “fair” legal rules.
This conflict, however, does not apply to a compensatory tort rule, because
the associated principle of fairness is not continuously traded off against some
component of welfare. The compensatory tort rule protects the individual right
to physical security for reasons of individual autonomy, thereby ruling out the
maximization of social welfare as the reason for compromising the right
holder’s autonomy. In this important sense, the individual right constrains social
85
welfare and can yield allocatively inefficient liability rules. However, the tort
right does not constrain social welfare in all possible states of the world. The
right only protects the autonomy of the right holder; it does not bar a right
holder from exercising her autonomy. A right holder’s fully informed exercise
of autonomy also promotes her welfare. Thus, when the right holder is
exercising her autonomy, fairness (autonomy) is not continuously traded off
against welfare. There simply is no tradeoff. Therefore, these rights-based rules
do not satisfy the continuity assumption of the Kaplow and Shavell proof, nor
do they violate the Pareto principle.
As shown by this example, a rights-based tort system can be justified by
some nonwelfarist value such as individual autonomy or equal freedom and still
be concerned about the welfare consequences of liability rules across a wide
range of cases. Welfare is not the only or even primary value of concern, and so
compensatory rights-based tort rules are “fair” as defined by Kaplow and
Shavell. The promotion of Pareto improvements is not the same as the
promotion of allocative efficiency. But welfare still matters. The governing
principle of justice can constrain the role of welfare considerations without
eliminating them. Economic analysis has importance within this constrained
and yet vitally important space; it helps us figure out what justice requires in the
case at hand, confirming Calabresi’s claims about the importance of distributive
economic analysis for normative evaluation in tort law.
V
CONCLUSION
Much like scholars once discussed risk distribution without adequately
defining the concept, the same has been true of compensation. Tort scholars

85. See supra Part III.C (explaining why a compensatory norm justifies allocatively inefficient
rules governing nonreciprocal risky interactions that occur outside of contractual relationships).
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have roundly rejected the proposition that tort liability can be plausibly
conceptualized in compensatory terms, relying on a reason that would seem to
foreclose further inquiry about the matter: “Measures of compensatory liability
sometimes exceed, sometimes fall short of, and sometimes bear no relation to
86
what is required to make the claimant whole.” The rejection of a
compensatory rationale for tort liability rests on the unexamined premise that
compensation is exclusively defined by the compensatory-damages remedy.
But just as Calabresi showed that the concept of risk distribution requires
87
elaboration, one can do the same with respect to a norm of compensation. The
payment of compensation by a duty holder can be defined by reference to all
expenditures required to satisfy the correlative compensatory right. A rigorous
specification of a compensatory tort right shows why the distribution of risk can
fully satisfy the compensatory demands of the right holder without an
entitlement to compensatory damages in all cases of accidental injury. Such a
tort system is not designed to minimize the social costs of accidents. To employ
Calabresi’s distributive taxonomy, a compensatory tort system instead shifts the
Pareto frontier outwards by permitting “changes that do not immediately create
88
new winners and uncompensated losers.” For reasons revealed by Calabresi’s
insights about risk distribution and the importance of distributive economic
analysis, the concept of compensation is much more nuanced than scholars have
recognized. Tort law can be plausibly interpreted in the compensatory terms of
the autonomy-based Pareto principle.

86. Emily Sherwin, Compensation and Revenge, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1387, 1388–89 (2003)
(arguing that the poor fit between compensation and the damages remedy suggests that compensatory
damages seek to counterbalance rather than repair a wrong, giving them a “close affinity to revenge”).
87. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.
88. Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto, supra note 7, at 1231.

